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Theodore Dreiser espoused in Sister Carrie a 
mechanistic or deterministic model for the operations of all 
the world, including human behavior. Nothing, he believed, 
was exempt from causality. He was heavily influenced in 
this belief by Herbert Spencer's metaphysical treatise First 
Principles. The aim of this thesis is to illuminate the 
influence of Spencer's work on Dreiser, to suggest how that 
influence helped Dreiser shape the plot of his novel, with 
particular reference to the mechanistic ethic for which it 
becomes almost a parable, a cautionary tale, and to show how 
Dreiser incorporates psychological verisimilitude into the 
novel to such an extent that he anticipates the efforts of 
modern clinical and ethical thinkers in the attempt to 
resolve the question: if man is not free, is he not fated
to do as he pleases?
It is rare that any one book can be said to have been 
influenced by any other to the extent that Sister Carrie was 
influenced by Herbert Spencer's First Principles, a meta­
physical treatise which proposes a wholly mechanistic or 
materialistic model for the world. The narrator of Sister 
Carrie refers specifically to Spencer's work, oddly enough 
in the form of a caveat;
For all the liberal analysis of Spencer and 
our modern naturalistic philosophers we have an 
infantile perception of morals. There is more to 
the subject than mere conformity to a law of 
evolution. It is yet peeper than conformity to 
things of earth alone.
Nonetheless, Dreiser goes on to make use of Spencer's
theories, and indeed places Carrie in a world in which the
material and mechanical are so heavily emphasized as to
obscure any glimpse of anything not "of earth alone."
Christopher Katope, in what is probably the most
thorough discussion of Spencer and Sister Carrie to date,
writes that First Principles provided Dreiser with an
"architechtonic element" for the novel and "helped him solve
the problems of character relationships and plot advance- 
2
ment." Katope views the novel as an illustration of 
evolution (as Spencer describes it), the narrative, the 
description and characterization fleshing out a skeleton of 
theory. He takes as a point of departure for this view, 
Spencer's model of evolution:
Evolution is an integration of matter and 
concomitant dissipation of motion; during which 
the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent 
homogeneity to a definite coherent 
heterogeneity. . . .
2Thus, Katope traces Carrie's progression from "indefinite-
ness," indecision, confusion of "her own image of herself
and the world's," into an artist of "differentiated,
4
self-assured complexity." The novel depicts Carrie's 
transformation from one of a class, just another shop girl, 
to "one of a kind," a celebrity who can trade on her unique 
identity. Simultaneously, Hurstwood's dissolution is shown, 
taking him from "coherent heterogeneity" to "incoherent 
homogeneity." From his position as Manager, "a well-known 
man about town," with a "solid substantial air," (SC, p. 43) 
whose vocation consists mainly of lending his own character 
to the atmosphere of the establishment, he degenerates to 
just another of the countless, nameless beggars in New York, 
wandering the streets, muttering "incoherently," unable to 
"think logically." (SC, p. 494) Katope goes on to argue 
that Dreiser sends Carrie and Hurstwood on their various 
perambulations through the city to illustrate the "dissipa­
tion of motion" which accompanies an organism's evolutionary 
5development. He also suggests that Carrie's rocking chair 
is introduced at various points as a "rhythmic prop" to 
suggest the "new order of rhythm" which, in Spencer's view, 
accompanies all evolution.^ These last two points, it 
should be noted, are not made very convincingly. The 
language with which Dreiser describes the activities, 
walking and rocking, is in no way evocative of Spencer, 
though elsewhere there are numerous deliberate echoes of the 
philosopher. In the absence of any auctorial pronouncement
3on the subject, therefore, the case for a deliberate parallel 
here seems tenuous, at best. Finally, Katope raises and too 
quickly drops the Spencerian concept of "equilibration," 
noting only that as the novel opens, Hurstwood is in a state 
of "equilibrium," his wants more or less matched by his 
means.
In much of this Katope is correct, but Spencer's
philosophy was much more to Dreiser than a skeleton for a
plot or a blueprint of the actions of his characters.
Katope fails to recognize the complete logical agreement
which Dreiser holds with Spencer. If Dreiser's view is
anywhere at variance with the philosopher's, it is nowhere
evidenced save in the caveat above. Moreover, Katope almost
ignores the concept of equilibration, the very concept most
fundamental to Sister Carrie. Equilibration is, in this
novel, the concept which dictated the moral slant, which, in
the words of Ronald Martin, provided "conceptual alternatives
7
to conventional morality."
Equilibration is also one of the concepts most funda­
mental to First Principles, one of the most basic blocks on 
which the work's argument is founded. The concept of 
equilibration arises because, to paraphrase Spencer, we 
necessarily conceive of our own (ultimately ineluctable) 
world as consisting of coexistent opposing forces, such as 
"attraction and repulsion" or "pressure and tension." (FP, 
p. 192) Given this, it follows that,
In all cases there is a progress toward 
equilibration. That universal coexistence of
4antagonist forces which, as we before saw, neces­
sitates the universality of rhythm, and which, as
we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of 
every force into divergent forces, at the same 
time necessitates the ultimate establishment of 
balance. (FP, p. 419)
Clearly, Dreiser took formulations such as this to 
heart for he constructed in Sister Carrie a system of forces 
and elements in varying states of equilibrium. The notions 
of balance and imbalance are all-pervasive, referred to 
specifically in philosophical asides, expressed in symbol
and embodied in the structure of the narrative.
Among the most specific references to balance is 
Dreiser’s reflection on the human condition as a "balance 
between good and evil" and what seems to be his description 
of human happiness:
There is nothing in this world more delightful 
than that middle state in which we mentally 
balance at times, possessed of means, lured by 
desire, and yet deterred by conscience or want of 
decision. (SC, p. 67)
Consistent with this view of human nature, Sister 
Carrie portrays characters struggling for balance and 
security against a tide of forces which drags all toward an 
entropic equilibrium. In the character rendered most 
subjectively we find the clearest example of this, as 
Hurstwood's progress is pictured in terms of a system of 
balances and imbalances, showing the operation of the 
equilibrating forces in the world. At the beginning of the 
novel Hurstwood is in a position of relative harmony with 
the world. Managing the bar provides him a nice balance of 
desires and means. He is content in his career. But, as
5Katope points out, Hurstwood's equilibrium is an "unstable"
9
one. The materialism of his wife and children threatens to 
overtake his means. Furthermore, his acrimonious relation­
ship with his wife and his estrangement from his children 
have caused him to live too much for his work. As domestic 
harmony degenerates, Hurstwood looks for compensation 
elsewhere: " . . .  his interest in Drouet's little shop girl
grew in an almost evenly balanced proportion." (SC, p. 115) 
Normally, the tendency toward balance deters Hurstwood:
Once in a while he would meet a woman whose youth, 
sprightliness and humor would make his wife seem 
deficient by contrast, but the temporary dissatis­
faction which such an encounter might arouse would 
be counterbalanced by his social position and a 
certain matter of policy. (SC, p. 85)
Hurstwood's domestic difficulties, however, are exacerbated
to a point which suppresses any discretion or indecision
which might restrain him. Then, when his indiscretions come
to light and he forfeits his home life entirely, Hurstwood
becomes desperate. He steals money from his employers and
steals Carrie from Drouet in an attempt to restore balance
and contentment. He succeeds, in the short term, in New
York. His status there erodes with respect to the outside
world, but this does not threaten his contentment at first,
for he does not fully sense this erosion. "If he did not,
it was due to the fact that his state was so well-balanced
that an absolute change for the worse did not show." (SC,
p. 339) Thus, even if his professional status is reduced,
his satisfaction with his youthful "wife" compensates for
this fact.
6Hurstwood's contentment cannot last long, because here, 
too, his equilibrium is unstable. Hurstwood is analogous to 
what Spencer calls an equilibrium mobile, a closed system of 
elements in equilibrium which is yet subject to the larger 
equilibrating forces of the world around it. Spencer 
illustrates with the example of a top, the gyroscopic 
equilibrium of which persists only until gravity and friction 
make their claims upon it. (FP, p. 240)
Because, as Ernest Griffin puts it, Dreiser's "plots 
and characters gather significance when related to studies" 
of more modern thinkers (he has the existentialist Norman O. 
Brown and Herbert Marcuse in mind), it might be useful here 
to turn to the work of several theorists whose work suggests 
the psychological verisimilitude with which Dreiser, drawing 
from Spencer, imbues Sister Carrie.^  Some contemporary 
psychologists examining, much as the way Dreiser has done, 
the full range of sacrifices and rewards, both economic and 
intangible, in social and intimate transactions, have 
concluded that there is a natural drive to balance expendi­
ture and gain. This, loosely stated, is what they call 
"equity theory." The central tenet of equity theory is 
this: "When individuals find themselves participating in
inequitable relationships, they will become distressed. The 
more inequitable the relationship, the more distress the 
individuals will feel."^ On the most intimate and 
intangible level, Dreiser depicts the inequity of love, the 
disparity of feeling and commitment between Hurstwood and
7Carrie; Carrie does not entirely reciprocate Hurstwood's 
affection. Another theorist, Merleau-Ponty, describes the 
probable result of such an imbalance:
This is what happens in the case where there 
is more love felt on one side than on the other: 
one throws himself, and his whole life, into his 
love, the other remains free, finding in this love 
a merely contingent manner of living. The former 
feels his being and substance flowing away into 
that freedom^hich confronts him, whole and 
unqualified.
Clearly, this is what has happened with Hurstwood and 
Carrie. She is not in love with him in Chicago, though his 
influence is sufficient "almost to delude her into the 
belief that she was possessed of a lively passion for him." 
(SC, p. 205) Carrie finds in their attachment only a 
"contingent manner of existence," in fact assents to it only 
as such. Hurstwood, begging her to come with him, promises, 
"You can see Montreal and New York, and then, if you don't 
want to stay you can go back." Under these terms, for the 
first time, Carrie finds the arrangement remotely acceptable.
The first gleam of fairness shown in this 
proposition for Carrie. It seemed a plausible 
thing to do, much as she feared opposition if she 
tried to carry it out. Montreal and New York.
Even now she was speeding toward those strange 
lands and she could see them if she liked. She 
thought, but made no sign. (SC, p. 279)
Carrie acquiesces in the proposition, but demands the
freedom to leave if she wants to. (SC, p. 280) Hurstwood
later broods over what he has lost: "his host of friends,
his name, his house and family . . . his dignity, his merry
meetings, his pleasant evenings," feeling (as Merleau-Ponty
might characterize it) his "being and substance flowing
8away." (SC, p. 287) Hurstwood's "substance" passes, in a 
sense, into that 'whole and unqualified freedom' which 
Carrie comes to possess, because Carrie will gain from the 
relationship a form of that which Hurstwood sacrifices for 
her, celebrity and flexibility within cosmopolitan society.
Established in New York, Hurstwood experiences a period 
of contentment, but only because he ignores the erosion of 
domestic tranquility which the disparity of feeling makes 
inevitable.
At any moment the extremes of feeling might be 
anti-polarized at the dinner table. This often 
happens in the best regulated families. Little 
things brought out on such occasions need great 
love to obliterate them afterward. . . . Between
Hurstwood and Carrie, as we have shown, was no 
mutual great love.
Dreiser finds in the action of the equilibrating forces on
man the seed of destruction of Hurstwood's temporary
contentment:
Either (man) is growing stronger, healthier, 
wiser as the youth approaching manhood, or he is 
growing weaker, older and less incisive mentally, 
as the man approaching old age. There are no 
other states. Frequently, there is a period 
between the cessation of youthful accretion and 
the setting in, in the case of the middle-aged 
man, of the tendency toward decay when the two 
processes are almost perfectly balanced and there 
is little doing in either direction. Given time 
enough, however, the balance becomes a sagging to 
the grave side. (SC, p. 338)
In this passage we find a clear echo of Spencer's model of
evolution, and Dreiser's mentor sheds some light on the
course of Hurstwood's decline:
. . . the aggregate has at length parted with 
its excess of motion, and habitually receives as 
much from its environment as it habitually
9loses— when it has reached that equilibrium in 
which its changes end, it thereafter remains 
subject to all actions in its environment which 
may increase the quantity of motion it contains, 
and which in the lapse of time are sure, either 
slowly or suddenly to give its parts such excess 
of motion as will cause disintegration.
Accordingly, as its equilibrium is a very stable 
or unstable one, its dissolution may come quickly 
or may be indefinitely delayed. . . . (FP, p. 448)
Hurstwood's equilibrium is an unstable one, for his rela­
tionship to Carrie is unbalanced. Furthermore, his fortunes 
are due to decline, he no longer will 'receive as much as he 
habitually loses,' and this imbalance will hasten his 
disintegration. Dreiser posits yet another cause of disin­
tegration, Hurstwood's own morbid perception of disparity.
Constant comparison between his old state and his 
new showed a balance for the worse, which produced 
a constant state of gloom, or at least depression.
Now it has been shown experimentally that a 
constantly subdued frame of mind produces certain 
poisons in the blood, called katastates, just as 
virtuous feelings or pleasure and delight produce 
helpful chemicals called anastates. The poisons, 
generated by remorse, inveigh against the system 
and eventually produce marked physical deterio­
ration. To this Hurstwood was subject. (SC, 
p. 339)
Clearly, Dreiser intends to show Hurstwood undone by 
the many imbalances which arise in his world. Just as a 
plenist universe abhors a vacuum, Dreiser's equilibrating 
universe abhors imbalance and Hurstwood is swept away by the 
forces the world marshals to eliminate it.
The notion of balance pertains to far more than 
Hurstwood's fate. Dreiser has structured the novel in such 
a way as to suggest that he was trying to balance the 
elements of the novel itself. He loads Sister Carrie with
10
terms suggesting opposites and correlatives, reinforcing the 
sense of the world as a system of polarities struggling to 
strike a balance. Thus, he creates in Carrie "the passivity 
of soul which is always the mirror of the active world."
(SC, p. 157) He contrasts the "emotional" and "intellectual" 
nature. (SC, p. 378) He speaks of "the ancient attraction 
of the stale to the fresh." (SC, p. 105) Dreiser posits as 
the motors of human activity, "free-will" and "instinct."
(SC, p. 73) The need for balance dictates the operation, in 
the novel of a physical law, formulated in Spencer's work, 
"action and reaction are equal and opposite." (FP, p. 462) 
Thus, Dreiser writes of Hurstwood's epistolary wooing of 
Carrie, "By the natural law which governs all effort, what 
he wrote reacted upon him." (SC, p. 144) Possibly he has 
this principle in mind, too, when he has the critic state,
"If you wish to be merry, see Carrie's frown." (SC, p. 448) 
Dreiser suggests an equal and opposite reaction when he 
writes of Carrie, "So peculiar was her lonely, self- 
withdrawing temper, that she was becoming an interesting 
figure in the public eye." (SC, p. 478) Carrie (and Ames 
as well) seem to attract attention almost to the extent that 
they shun it.
Dreiser gives many elements in the novel their opposite 
number to insure a suggestion of balance in the structure.
The largest system of opposites occurs within the corres­
ponding ascent of Carrie and fall of Hurstwood. The two
characters very nearly trade positions, as is made clear by
%
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considering their respective positions at the beginning and
end of the novel. At the outset Carrie is a nearly helpless
waif apparently destined to end in the street, and Hurstwood
is a man of position and localized celebrity. As the novel
ends, Carrie has lifted herself above the faceless masses,
has fashioned an identity for herself, has become a
"personality," as is highly proclaimed to New York in the
glowing signs. (SC, p. 493) At the opposite pole is
Hurstwood; he has been assimilated into the nobodies. So
complete is his transformation that he becomes, in a sense,
the beggar he ignores as theater-goer in Chicago (p. 139),
begging in front of the New York theaters for something to
eat and the price of a bed. (SC, p. 492) The 1900,
"unexpurgated" edition of Sister Carrie suggests this
metamorphosis somewhat more strongly, with a clearer echo of
the beggar by Hurstwood. Here the beggar pleads, "Say
mister . . . , would you mind giving me the price of a bed?"
and "Honest to God, mister, I'm without a place to sleep."
(p. 103) Hurstwood later says, "Give me a little something,
13will you, mister? . . . For god's sake, do; I'm starving."
Thus, the progress to opposite ends of the spectrum is 
completed, as Carrie's name lights up the sky Hurstwood 
snuffs his light and the city sends his "nameless body to 
Potter's field.
Consistent with the importance of balance in the novel 
the action is structured to suggest a device of counter­
weights. We see the fortunes of Hurstwood descend to
counterbalance the ascent of Carrie, and we can mark the 
strata through which they pass. The first stop on Hurstwood 
fall is the point at which he begins to measure himself 
against Drouet. Hurstwood " . . .  envied him, and now as he 
looked at the well-dressed, jolly salesman whom he so much 
liked, the cold gleam of the rival glowed in his eye." (SC, 
p. 108) Inherent in this rivalry is an equation of indi­
viduals, and this is a reduction in stature for Hurstwood 
who should be superior to Drouet. At the same time, Carrie 
is said to have come up a bit in the world; " . . .  when 
Hurstwood called he found a young woman who was much more 
than the Carrie Drouet had first spoken to." (SC, p. 105)
On the train to Detroit Hurstwood's reduction is more 
complete and he plays the part of the "masher," offering a 
"berth in the sleeper," and the use of his coat. (SC, 
p. 281) Carrie's superiority to Hurstwood at this point is 
clearly established by his abject prostration before her.
Carrie's rise to success in the theater is, at least in 
its beginning, necessitated by Hurstwood's continued decline 
Unemployed, he finds himself in New York every bit as 
dependent upon her as she had once been on Drouet. In a 
continuance of the role-reversing trend of the action, 
Hurstwood's dependence on Carrie ceases with the symbolic 
repayment of the exact sum with which Carrie's dependence 
upon Drouet began. (SC, p. 439) Continuing the trend, 
Hurstwood is shown at one point in the straits in which
13
Carrie begins the novel, one social rung above the street, 
with employ so tenuous as to be lost through illness. (SC, 
p. 463) Hurstwood, like Carrie, does lose his job through 
illness, but, on the "graveward" side of the continuum, 
there is no one to rescue him from the gutter.
Dreiser uses, in his counterweighted structure, the 
image of counterweighted devices at several key junctures. 
Minnie Hanson, in her dreams, sees her sister descending 
merrily to perdition in some sort of line-and-pulley device, 
"An old basket used for descending was hanging there, 
fastened by an old rope. . . . She began to pull the basket
over, and now in spite of all protest she had swung over and 
was going down— down." (SC/ p. 79) Later, when the twinned 
fortunes of Carrie and Hurstwood are in a state of temporary 
equilibrium, Carrie comes face to face with the cosmopolitan 
society (in the person of Mrs. Vance) for which she is 
destined, through a stationary dumbwaiter. (SC, p. 318) 
Carrie finally reverses her descent into perdition, in the 
person of Drouet, in her New York hotel, taking the elevator 
up, out of the reach of the salesman. (SC, p. 476) Thus, 
Dreiser manages to include as symbol a signature and 
suggestion of the structure of the whole novel.
The preoccupation with notions of equilibration and 
balance in Sister Carrie is more than a structural or an 
"architectonic" device. It leads to the considerable moral 
emphasis of the novel. It seems rather ironic that this 
particular novel was once regarded as immoral or amoral, for
14
the moral tone of Sister Carrie falls just short of 
didacticism. What Dreiser seems to have attempted is to 
start with certain metaphysical or meta-ethical principles 
(principles such as laws of nature or of the universe more 
fundamental than ethics, but out of which ethics necessarily 
come), and then to depict the operation of those principles, 
and the true ethic which arises from them, in the novel. In 
the process Dreiser mounts an attack on conventional morals 
or ethics.
Almost immediately, Sister Carrie seems to have drawn
the righteous indignation of those with very conventional
moral sensibilities. There are accounts detailing the
objections of either Frank Doubleday, the novel's eventual
publisher, or those of his wife, on moral grounds, and the
15near suppression of the novel on those grounds. While
hardly typical of the reviews, the following contemporary
review of Sister Carrie, catches the essence of the
moralistic objections to that work:
"Sister Carrie," by Theodore Dreiser. The author 
calls his work a novel of city life, but he might 
have been more descriptive had he called it a 
novel of the worst side of city life. . . .
The book is unhealthful in tone, however, and its 
literary quality^is not high enough to cover its 
faults of theme.
The book is flawed, in this reviewer's eyes and apparently
for the Doubledays, by its lack of overtly moral theme, by
the fact that neither Carrie nor Drouet are punished for
their adulteries. As his diaries and biographies attest,
Dreiser's sexual mores were unconventional for the time, and
15
this is reflected in his work, but Sister Carrie is by no 
means amoral.
Dreiser, along with Spencer, holds that the same laws
which describe the operation of natural phenomena describe
the motivations and behavior of men as well. Dreiser sees
man being borne along by the forces of nature, "Among the
forces which sweep and play through the universe, untutored
man is but a wisp in the wind." (SC/ P* 73) Man is subject
to the tyranny of his own chemistry and instinct, but
Dreiser's view of the world does not preclude free will.
We see man far removed out of the lairs of the 
jungles, his innate instincts dulled by too near 
an approach to free will, his free will scarcely 
sufficiently developed to replace his instincts 
and afford him perfect guidance. (SC, p. 73)
What Dreiser means by free will, however, is not the conven­
tional notion of the concept. Some years after writing 
Sister Carrie, in his philosophical writings, Dreiser 
ridiculed what sounds like the Victorian notion of free 
will:
But assume that the battery, finding itself to be 
a battery, (although, as in the case of man, not 
knowing just how or why), exclaims to itself— By 
God! I made that bell ring! . . . Yet man says to
himself— See, I am a man, I am^iyaking my way in 
life. I am master of my fate.
Dreiser ridicules philosophically naive notions of free
will, particularly those which require free will and deny
causation to support their view of the operation of ethical
principles. Dreiser would surely have encountered some
version of one such system of thought in his Catholic
catechism, an echo of which, the theological "problem of
16
evil," we find him mocking in An American Tragedy.
For in some blind, dualistic way both she and Asa 
[Clyde Griffiths* parents] insisted, as do all 
religionists, in disassociating God from harm and 
error and misery, while granting him nevertheless 
supreme control. They would seek for something 
else— some malign, treacherous, deceiving power 
which, in the face of God's omniscience and 
omnipotence, still beguiles and betrays— and find 
it eventually in the error and perverseness of the 
human heart, which-god has made, yet which he does 
not control. . . .
Dreiser, in a letter to H. L. Mencken, makes Spencer at
least partly responsible for the philosophical demise of his
religious beliefs. "(Spencer, Huxley and Tyndall) shifted
my point of view tremendously, confirmed my worst suspicions
and destroyed the last remaining traces of Catholicism which
19I now detest as a political organization or otherwise."
Apparently, Dreiser does not wish to divorce any class
of phenomena entirely from the material laws, or from the
fact of causation. He has taken his cue from First
Principles where Spencer specifically includes action of the
mind, heart or soul, in his discussion of physical phenomena:
In what we distinguish as acquired habits, and in 
the moral differences of races and nations produced 
by habits that are maintained through successive 
generations, we have countless illustrations of 
this progressive adaptation; which can cease only 
with the establishment of a complete equilibrium 
between constitutions and conditions.
Possibly some will fail to see how the equilibra­
tions described in this section can be classed 
with those preceding them. . . . Nevertheless, 
such equilibrations are as truly physical as the 
rest. . . . For the present it must suffice to
point out, as before, that what we know subjec­
tively as states of consciousness are, objectively, 
modes of force. . . . (FP, p. 438)
17
Clearly, Dreiser holds with Spencer here. We have the
evidence of his discussion of katastates and anastates to
attest to the fact that Dreiser did not divorce subjective
and physical phenomena. Also, in his accounting for
Carrie's lack of conscience, as she goes with Drouet to a
restaurant after the theater, Dreiser echoes Spencer's
notion that "moral differences" are produced by "habit."
If any habits had ever had time to fix upon her, 
they would have operated here. Habits are peculiar 
things. They will drive the really non-religious 
mind out of bed to say prayers that are only a 
custom and not a devotion. The victim of habit, 
when he has neglected the thing which was customary 
with him to do, feels a little scratching in the 
brain, a little irritating something which comes 
of being out of the rut, and imagines it to be the 
prick of conscience, the still, small voice that 
is urging him ever to righteousness. (SC, p. 77)
Having apparently reduced morals to a matter of habit 
and custom, it would seem that Dreiser is making a nihilistic 
attack on ethics as a whole. His relatively neutral report­
ing of Carrie's adultery and Hurstwood's thievery gives rise 
to the view that Sister Carrie is an a-moral work. But what 
he has actually attempted is to explode conventional morality 
and to supplant it with what he regards as a "true ethic."
The nature of the moral strain which Dreiser wishes to 
expose is aptly pointed up by lines from "Under the 
Gaslight," the play in which Carrie gains her first 
theatrical experience. Speaking of the character Carrie 
portrays, one of the actors declaims,
Have you ever heard of the Siberian wolves? When 
one of the pack falls through weakness, the others 
devour him. It is not an elegant comparison— but
18
there is something wolfish in society. Laura has 
mocked it with a pretence, and society, which is 
made up of pretences, will bitterly resent the 
mockery. (SC, p. 184)
When Carrie makes her entrance in the same scene of the play 
". . . the social pack moved away from her scornfully."
(SC, p. 185) It is, in Dreiser's view, a reversion to the 
instinctive side of man's nature that leads us into the sort 
of pack morality depicted in the play. Hurstwood is moti­
vated by this pack morality. This is made clear when his 
deliverations before stealing the money occasion this 
reflection by the narrator:
We must remember that it may not be a knowledge of 
right, for no knowledge of right is predicated of 
the animal's instinctive recoil at evil. Men are 
still led by instincts before they are regulated 
by knowledge. It is instinct which recalls the 
criminal— it is instinct, (where highly organized 
reasoning is absent), which gives the criminal his 
feeling of danger, his fear of wrong. (SC, 
p. 269)
Though Hurstwood vacillates for a long time before 
taking the money, it is his drive for self-preservation 
which deters him, not a real consideration of right and 
wrong. "The true ethics of the situation never occurred to 
him. It is most certain they never would have, under any 
circumstances." (SC, p. 270) The "true ethics" of the 
situation would never occur to Hurstwood because he has no 
real ethic. He has middle class morals but they are a 
system of deceptions and lies, meeting the world, like his 
"home life," through "force of habit, by force of conven­
tional opinion." His morals arise out of what the equity
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theorists call "psychological equity." Individuals naturally
attempt to reduce the distress of perceived inequity. "A
person can restore psychological equity to a relationship by
distorting reality in appropriate ways. He can try to
convince himself that an inequitable relationship is, in
2 0fact, equitable." (SC, p. 87) His bourgeois conscience 
divorces itself from the many inequities about which it can 
do nothing but suffer distress, setting up instead a delu­
sional moral order. The only sin in this sort of moral 
order is getting caught. Hurstwood, therefore, "lost 
sympathy for the man that made a mistake and was found out." 
(SC, p. 85) He is as ready as the rest of the pack to fall 
on the unfortunate wretch. As Hurstwood discovers, however, 
his wifefs pack instinct seems to be a little more highly 
developed. "Mrs. Hurstwood felt something, she knew not 
what, sniffing change as animals do danger, afar off." 
Hurstwood commits the cardinal error, dis found out, and his 
wife, sensing her advantage, sets upon him. Dreiser salts 
the confrontation with bestial imagery. "Hurstwood pricked 
up his ears . . . ," at the tone of his wife's voice. He
tries to ignore it asking, "Where did George get that dog he 
has there in the yard?" (SC, p. 219) Later, sensing 
instinctively her husband's final defeat, Mrs. Hurstwood 
"turned upon him, animal-like, able to strike an effectual 
second blow." (SC, p. 220) Shown in her final victory,
"She gazed at him— a pythoness in humor." (SC, p. 221)
Thus, Dreiser shows middle class morality for the "pretence"
20
he believes it to be. In place of reasonable consideration 
of the ethics of a given situation, there is a blind, 
instinctive groping for either safety or advantage.
We will do well to recall, at this juncture, that 
Dreiser opposes his notion of free will to instinct, and so 
it is possible that by taking up the examination of free 
will, we can illuminate the nature of what he considers 
"true ethics." Dreiser does not furnish a philosophical 
aside explaining just what he meant by "free will," but he 
does make clear that it is dependent upon and potentiated by 
understanding. In the narrative this is illustrated primar­
ily by negative example. Drouet, for instance, can be only 
"as good as his intellect conceived." (SC, p. 64) Later he 
is shown, in virtue of his ignorance, to be a fine proof of 
a deterministic or fatalist model of the world:
That worthy had his future fixed for him beyond a 
peradventure. He could not help what he was going 
to do. He could not see clearly enough to wish to 
do differently. He was drawn by innate desire to 
act the old pursuing part. (SC, p. 75)
Hurstwood is trapped in his fate, much like Drouet, by lack 
of capacity for understanding or analysis. He is more 
truthful than he suspects when he tells Carrie of his 
desperate deception of her, "I was simply put where I didn't 
know what else to do." (SC, p. 279) Hurstwood is doomed by 
his own chemistry because, "Not trained to reason or intro­
spect himself, he could not analyze the change that was 
taking place in his mind and hence his body." (SC, p. 339) 
There is an alternative:
21
It is the higher mental development which induces 
philosophy and that fortitude which refuses to 
dwell upon such things— refuses to be made to 
suffer by their consideration. (SC, p. 341)
Carrie, on the other hand, while no intellectual, tends to
be made more free by what powers of observation and analysis
she has. Carrie, on the stage in New York, is very different
from the Carrie of Chicago who was reluctant to "recite
without solicitation.” (SC, p. 171) Her keener perception
of her relation to, and worth to the world, leads her to
"break part" (as Drouet was said to be incapable of doing)
in a performance, to deviate from the role laid out for her.
He [the star] expected no answer and a dull one 
would have been reproved. But Carrie, whose 
experience and belief in herself gave her daring, 
courtsied sweetly again and answered:
"I am yours truly." (SC, p. 431)
She has changed in other ways, too:
Experience of the world and of necessity was in 
her favor. No longer the lightest word of a man
made her head dizzy. She had learned that men
could change and fail. Flattery in its most 
palpable form had lost its force with her. (SC, 
p. 432)
Dreiser attempts in Sister Carrie a narrative resolution 
of the paradox of a world where there is mechanistic causa­
tion, fate, and there is also free will. Deliberately, and 
to some extent constrained by the nature of this under­
taking, he fashioned a tragedy. As Donald Pizer observes,
Dreiser himself called Sister Carrie the "tragedy of a man's 
21life." Sister Carrie is, in part anyway, Carrie's portrait 
as dramatic artist. Dreiser could hardly have written a
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novel so intrinsically concerned with the theater without
having been mindful of the dramatic archetypes in the story.
We have W. A. Swanberg's recounting of Dreiser's burst of
enthusiasm for Sophocles, in an instance where the tragedian
sounds precociously existentialist.
These two literary realists (Dreiser and Edgar Lee 
Masters) saw each other almost every day, and 
Floyd Dell, dropping in on them at Tenth Street, 
found them reading Sophocles aloud: "0 ye
deathward going tribes of men, what do yogg lives 
mean except that they go to nothingness."
With this in mind, and given Larzer Ziff's suggestion
that "Spencer operated for Dreiser as a choric explanation
of experience," it is arguable that Dreiser's numerous
philosophical asides are similar to the Greek's choral
declamations, serving the function of informing the audience
as to the nature of the higher forces with which the charac- 
23ters struggle. As m  Sophoclean tragedy, each of the 
characters is given a fate in this novel, and each is given 
a sort of limited free will to either accept or attempt to 
circumvent his fate. Their autonomy is much like that of 
their classical counterparts, as abstracted by J. C. 
Opstetelten: "(Fate's) operation, on the one hand, coincides
with the deployment of devine power, and, on the other hand, 
operates actively not so much over against man as out of 
him, as an immanent force belonging to man's ultimate 
being. . . . That is why Sophocles' heroes appear at once 
to act freely and to fulfil their destiny. . . . "  Interest­
ingly, Hurstwood resembles the Sophoclean hero in more than 
his conditioned freedom, for as Opstelten goes on to observe
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of the Greek's typical protagonist, often, "His only
24rehabilitation is a self-chosen death." To a certain 
extent, one's struggle against fate hastens one's dissolu­
tion. But as Pizer aptly argues, Dreiser's adaptation of 
tragedy is not strictly classical in form. Hurstwood's fall 
is not the product of a single transgression, the hamartia, 
or sin, of Sophocles and Aristotle.
Hurstwood's fall is not primarily a tragedy of 
chance, of the accidental closing of the safe. It 
is principally the tragedy of a man who thinks he 
is impregnable but who is then discovered to be 
weak when his2desires drive him outside protection 
of his roles.
Hurstwood's tragedy is partly that of the modern "everyman,"
a "medieval tragedy," a "fall from high places as the
universal forces of 'circumstance' and 'subconscious direc-
2 6tion' have their day."
Hurstwood only hastens his undoing with his crime, that 
being only a part of his larger tendency to test "the 
boundaries which necessity sets." (SC, p. 132) Hurstwood 
steals the money because he takes typical "bad faith" view 
of money, seeing it as "usurped privilege." (SC, p. 62)
The money represents to Hurstwood a usurpation of dominance? 
his theft is an attempt to escape the social order. Dreiser 
describes Hurstwood's deluded presumption in terms reminis­
cent of the classical, anthropomorphizing world view:
A prisoner of fate, held enchained for his own 
delight, he does not know that the walls are tall, 
that the sentinels of life are forever pacing, 
musket in hand. He cannot perceive that all joy 
is within and not without. He must be for scaling 
the bounds of society, for overpowering the 
sentinel. (SC, p. 132)
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Hurstwood's presumption is a violation of the social order
as conceived by Spencer and enforced by equilibration. For
Spencer, ideally, no desires are entertained but those which
may be "properly" enacted within the context of society.
Thus, his hypothetical universal equilibrium will be, "the
arrival at a state of human nature and social organization,
such that the individual has no desires but those which may
be satisfied without exceeding the proper sphere of 
27action. . . ." Hurstwood's failure, m  Spencerian terms,
is a failure of "equilibration between man's desires and the 
conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions." (FP, 
p. 443) Hurstwood's transgressions, like those of Carrie 
and Drouet, do not necessitate swift retribution. Dreiser 
depicts instead a slow and subtle evolution of Hurstwood's 
"surrounding conditions," a change which renders them 
hostile to the saloonkeeper, as he himself grows less 
adaptable.
The proper exercise of free will, as opposed to 
Hurstwood's, is "philosophic" resignation, "alignment with 
the forces" which govern the universe, something akin to 
acceptance of the will of the gods. Ames is the only 
character in the novel to achieve this resignation. He is, 
in his denigration of material pretence, akin to ". . . the
Epictitus who smiles when the last vestige of physical 
welfare has been removed." (SC, p. 340) Ames, at Sherry's, 
shows disdain for the "usurped privilege" of the nouveau 
riche:
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I sometimes think it's a shame for people to 
spend so much money this way. . . . They pay so 
much more than these things are worth. They put 
on so much show. (SC, p. 334)
Ames is so far from the sort of self-destructive brooding
that Hurstwood engages in, over "constant comparison of his
old state and his new," that he takes Carrie away from her
own materialistic dissatisfactions.
He had taken away some of the bitterness of the 
contrast between this life and her life, all by a 
certain defiant indifference which concerned only 
him. (SC, p. 336)
Ames' superiority consists partly in his "indifference" to 
the tides of materialism. Manifest elsewhere, less perfectly 
in the less perfect creatures of the material world, even 
the appearance of indifference can be a distinguishing 
feature of superiority. Hurstwood, before his precipitous 
decline, is still capable of presenting a detached appear­
ance to the world, for while, "Drouet was palavering with 
the loosesness of excitement and passion. The manager 
mastered himself only by a superhuman effort." (SC, p. 193) 
Mrs. Hurstwood vanquishes her husband in their confrontation 
partly in virtue of her unprecedented "cruel look of indif­
ference." (SC, p. 220) After her dinner with the Vances 
and Ames, Carrie aspires to Ames' calm, taking her leave 
with "feigned indifference." (SC, p. 337)
The quality of indifference, such as Ames manifests, 
seems to be the saving grace in the tragic world of Sister 
Carrie. It is to be distinguished from the indifference of 
apathy and torpor into which Hurstwood sinks in New York.
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It is a product of the process of resignation, in its purest
form, of philosophical resignation. (In Ames' case the
quality resembles what Kierkegaard spoke of as "infinite 
2 8resignation.") In almost all cases a certain passivity 
seems to bring one into more fortuitous 'alignment with the 
forces.' Thus, Carrie, with her "passivity of soul," is the 
one smiled upon by the gods. (SC/ P- 157) Thus too, Ames 
advocates self-abnegation as the highest calling. The 
electrical expert speaks in terms reminiscent of conduction 
versus resistance, "You and I are but mediums through which 
something is expressing itself. Now, our duty is to make 
ourselves ready mediums." (SC, p. 485) The "something" 
which expresses itself, is the same power which Opstelten 
sees coming "out of" man, the "immanent force belonging to 
man's ultimate being."
Dreiser, through Ames, confronts us directly with a 
curious form of freedom, one which incorporates both compul­
sion (by that which "expresses something") and choice, to 
recognize or ignore one's "duty." Under Spencer's model, as 
his concepts appear in this novel, free will and fate or 
determinism are just two more of the opposites or correla­
tives through which we must envision the world. In Sister 
Carrie we never see absolute freedom or absolute determinism, 
the characters are free in proportion to their understanding 
of their situation and the forces being brought to bear upon 
them. Absolute freedom and absolute compulsion lose meaning 
in this context, just as it is meaningless to say, for
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instance, that anything is absolutely expensive or absolutely 
cheap. (Dreiser would not admit to anything being, in the 
economic sense, "free.") One can be only more or less free. 
As Dreiser portrays it, freedom sounds very much like the 
freedom of Merleau-Ponty's succinct analysis:
What then is freedom? To be born is to be 
born of the world and to be born into the world.
The world is already constituted, but also never 
completely constituted; in the first case we are 
acted upon, in the second we are open to an 
infinite number of possibilities. But this 
analysis is still abstract, for we exist in both 
ways at once. There is, therefore, never 
determinism and never absolute choice. . . . The 
generality of the "role" and of the situation 
comes to the aid of decision, and in this exchange 
between the situation and the person who takes it 
up, it is impossible to determine precisely the 
"share contributed by the situation" and the 
"share contributed by freedom."
Dreiser seems to feel too that we are "open to an 
infinite number of possibilities"? man for him is "a creature 
of incalculable variability." (SC, p. 73) The world, as 
Merleau-Ponty says, "is never completely constituted, just 
as, for Dreiser, "evolution is ever in action." (SC, p. 7 3) 
The fact that man is not independent of "the forces which 
sweep and play throughout the universe" (SC, p. 73) leaves 
him, for both Dreiser and Merleau-Ponty, vacillating between 
freedom and compulsion. The fact of determinism, that there 
is causation, that the forces of the universe shape and 
sometimes govern human behavior, does not explode, for 
Dreiser, all morality. He is not speaking metaphorically 
when he speaks of morals and ethics. Early in Sister 
Carrie, Dreiser waves some philosophical expostulations into
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the narrative, and these point the way to a morality within
the framework of causation and mechanistic philosophy:
Answer first, why the heart thrills: explain
wherefore some plaintive note goes wandering about 
the world undying, make clear the rose's subtle 
alchemy, evolving its ruddy lamp in light and 
rain. In the essence of these facts lie the first 
principles of morals.
"Oh," thought Drouet, "how delicious is my 
conquest."
"Ah," thought Carrie with mournful misgivings,
"what is it I have lost?"
Before this world-old proposition we stand, 
serious, interested, confused; endeavouring to 
evolve the true theory of morals— the true answer 
to what is right. (SC, p. 88)
This is not simply rhetoric, Sister Carrie constitutes 
Dreiser's "endeavour to evolve" a theory of morals, for in 
these simple reflections of Carrie and Drouet is a clue to 
the nature of morality. The salient point of their respec­
tive positions is this: Drouet's boon necessitates Carrie's 
loss.- Nothing can be gained on the one hand without a 
correlative loss on the other, and this is a principle 
derived from nature itself, like the "rose's alchemy." All 
gain and loss is simply equilibration. This forms the moral 
crux of the novel. Hurstwood errs under the terms of the 
novel's ethic because he believes he can separate gain and 
loss, action and reaction. He is one of those without 
"Conception of a well-organized society wherein all shall 
accept a certain quota of responsibility and all realize a 
certain amount of happiness." (SC, p. 132) He enters into 
his liaison with Carrie, with " . . .  only a thought of
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pleasure without responsibility. . . .  He would be happy
with her and his own affairs would go on undisturbed." (SC,
p. 133) He is like Joyce's "sentimentalist," " . . .  who
would enjoy without incurring the immense debtorship for a 
30thing done." He is more literally correct, once again, 
than he knows when he tells Carrie, ". . . 1  need someone to 
waste a little affection on me." (SC, p. 128) "Waste" is 
the correct word because he feels no corresponding 
responsibility or obligation incurred by the privilege of 
intimacy. Ames is the only character of the novel to grasp 
the underlying ethical principle of their world and he 
presents us with a sort of moral summary in the form of his 
advice to Carrie. The advice he gives has both ethical and 
aesthetic significance, but, most important, it shows the 
relation of Carrie's self-interest to her moral obligation:
It so happens that you have the power to act.
That is no credit to you. You might not have had 
it. It isn't an excuse for pride or self glori­
fication. You paid nothing to get it. But now 
that you have it you must do something with 
i t . . . .
You have so much sympathy and such a melodious 
voice— make them valuable to others. You will 
have them so long as they express something in 
you. . . . You can't become self-interested,
selfish and luxurious without having these 
sympathies and longings disappear. . . . You 
can't remain tender and sympathetic, and desire to 
serve the world without having it show in your 
face and your art. (SC, p. 486)
By themselves, Ames' assertions do not seem necessarily 
to follow, but in light of the novel's metaphysics they 
prove to be logical. Dreiser has asserted that money, in 
its true analysis, proves to be "stored energy." (SC,
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p. 62) As such, it simply cannot be created ex nihilo.
Carrie paid nothing to get her talent, but still it seems to 
mint money out of the air. Money must conform, like all 
other forces in the world, to the principle of equilibration; 
therefore, the books must balance. Carrie has incurred a 
debt, her own equilibrium is therefore unstable. In a state 
of equilibrium the balance "habitually receives from its 
environment as much as it habitually loses. . . . "  (FP, 
p. 448) When it ceases to, as in Hurstwood's case, dissolu­
tion sets in immediately. The world sees to it subtly that 
it does not give more than it habitually receives. Carrie 
gets nothing for nothing? her satisfaction with wealth 
shrinks as fast as wealth grows.
It does not take money long to make plain its 
impotence providing the desires are in the realm 
of affection. With her one hundred fifty dollars 
in hand Carrie could think of nothing particularly 
to do. . . . If she wanted to do anything better
or move higher, she must have more— a great deal 
more. (S£, p. 457)
Thus, Ames' advice amounts to a call for Carrie to seek 
artistic and selfless satisfactions, rather than material 
satisfaction. Artistic satisfaction would consist partly in 
benefit to others and would presumably require a higher 
effort of Carrie. It would serve then to balance Carrie's 
debt, eliminate the debt's "drag on her soul." (SC, p. 477) 
It would allow her to make an act of restitution, restoring 
as the social scientists have it, "actual equity," without 
resorting to the delusional systems required by psychological 
equity seeking, delusions which would threaten the "sympathy"
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Ames sees as necessary to her art. (SC, p. 477) The 
balance would then be restored to her life. She would 
receive, in satisfaction, as much from her environment as 
she lost, and dissolution would be forestalled. So, Ames 
(and Spencer) have clearly pointed the way for Carrie, but 
Dreiser leaves it unresolved at the novel's end whether she 
will follow it, or fall victim to her material success.
Clearly, Dreiser has woven a moral principle into 
Sister Carrie finding in equilibration a balance on which 
the true ethical considerations of the story may be weighed. 
He proposes an ethic which eschews the particular proscrip­
tion (Thou shalt not commit adultery, for instance) and 
calls for recognition of a generalizable principle: respon­
sibility follows on privilege and gain, just as reaction 
follows action. Having started with the most abstract of 
physical principles, he constructed a work in which that 
principle shaped, consistently, the language, structure and 
plot, and in so doing instanced an ethical principle operant 
within, even necessitated by, the principles of a mechanistic 
model of the world.
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